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This paper compares Heidegger’s “dasein-centric” existential hermeneutic to Levinas’s primacy 
of the Other and the importance the latter places on the ethical relationship. Invoking the 
concepts of totality and infinity, the paper discusses the ways in which one encounters the Other 
and how signification arises from the ethical relationship. This is followed by a discussion of how 
Levinas’s ethics might influence existential phenomenological research methodology, pointing to 
the ethical demands described by Levinas as seeming to have priority over the praxis of research 
insofar as the Other calls us beyond the methodological framework. Finally, the paper considers 
the extent to which the ethical demands of Levinas’s phenomenology are met by the special place 
of the research participant and the attitude of empathic presence prescribed within the 






This paper seeks to explore the practical implications 
of Levinas’s phenomenology of the Other for 
existential-phenomenological research in the tradition 
of the so-called “Duquesne School” and at the 
University of Dallas (see Garza, 2004, for a broader 
discussion of this lineage). It is acknowledged that 
there is a wide variety of phenomenological research 
done elsewhere, including Duquesne University (for 
more detailed accounts of this lineage, see 
Polkinghorne, 1989; Smith, 1983, 2002; and von 
Eckartsberg, 1998) and Seattle University (Halling, 
Kunz, & Rowe, 1994). Within the Duquesne and 
Dallas traditions, phenomenological research has 
been rooted in Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
(Garza, 2007). At Seattle University, however, the 
dialogal approach to phenomenological research of 
Kunz and his colleagues has a Levinasian foundation 
(Halling et al., 1994; Kunz, 2006), representative of 
an emerging direction in phenomenological research. 
The scope of this paper limits our ability to speak to 
the broad variety of phenomenological research.1 We 
have, however, discussed this variety elsewhere 
(Garza, 2007), but for our present purposes we will 
limit ourselves to the tradition of research born out of 
the “Duquesne School”2 and currently practised at the 
                                                 
1  See, for example, to point to just a few: Benner, 1985, 
1994, 2000; Dahlberg, Drew, & Nystrom, 2001; Dahlberg 
& Halling, 2001; Moustakas, 1990, 1994; Schutz, 1979; 
Schutz & Luckman, 1973; researchers inspired by 
Schutz’s work like Frank, 1978; MacRae, 2004; Parsons, 
1973; Sorrell, 2006; Thibodeau & MacRae, 1997; and, 
finally, van Manen, 1990, 1997. 
2 For examples of foundational research from the Duquesne 
School, see the following [all cited in Churchill & Wertz, 
2002]: Aanstoos, 1984; Colaizzi, 1973, 1978; Fischer, 
1974, 1978, 1985; Giorgi, 1975, 1985; Giorgi et al., 1971-
1983; Valle, 1998; Valle & Halling, 1989; Van Kaam, 
1959, 1966; von Eckartsberg, 1971, 1986; Wertz, 1982; 
Wertz & Aanstoos, 1999. 
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University of Dallas.3 Thus our use of the term 
“existential phenomenological (EP) research” should 
be understood as encompassing not only experiential 
research as pioneered by Giorgi (1985), but all 
models of phenomenological research that aim to 
illuminate lived meaning and experience. This 
includes not only archival/historical research, attitude 
research and intentional ethnography (Garza, 2007), 
but also any research that meets Giorgi’s defining 
characteristics of a phenomenological method as 
encompassing: description, use of the phenomeno-
logical reduction, consideration of intentionality, 
disclosure of essences or structures as results, and the 
necessity that the researcher hold a “psychological 
perspective” in reference to the data (1985; Giorgi & 
Giorgi, 2003). 
  
As mentioned above, the epistemology of EP research 
has traditionally been rooted in Husserl, Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty within the “Duquesne School” 
and at the University of Dallas. As our point of 
departure, we will invoke the ontology of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time as the epistemological foundation of 
EP research. We will focus upon this Heideggerian 
foundation on the basis that Levinas’s philosophy can 
be seen as a direct and explicit counterpoint to 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.4 The Heidegger-
ian framework, as a juxtaposition to Levinas, will 
situate our inclusion of Levinas as an alternative 
foundation to phenomenological research that, 
following Levinas, is no longer “existential”. We will 
begin by discussing Heidegger’s exclusion and 
Levinas’s inclusion of ethics in their philosophical 
writings. Using their divergent views in this regard as 
a starting point, we will discuss how and to what 
extent the ethical demands of Levinas’s phenomen-
ology apply to phenomenological research. We will 
discuss the distinguished place of the research 
participant and the attitude of empathic presence for 
the researcher, and address the concerns of violence 
and thematization inherent in research.  
  
Heidegger’s and Levinas’s Treatment of Ethics 
 
In his seminal work Being and Time (1927), 
Heidegger does not address ethics in his attempt to 
“destroy the history of ontology”. Absent in this 
seminal work, ethics is not a topic that Heidegger sets 
out to discuss in his primary concern with ontology. 
                                                 
3  For examples of research conducted at the University of 
Dallas, see Garza, 2004, 2007; and Landrum, 2008. 
4  While Levinas’s philosophy can be seen as a reaction to 
Heidegger, there are striking similarities between Levinas 
and the later Heiddegger, despite Levinas seemingly not 
having read Heidegger’s later works (Alfonso Lingis, 
personal communication, March 27, 2009). The possible 
confluence of these two thinkers, however, remains 
beyond the scope of this article. 
Heidegger states that “only as phenomenology is 
ontology possible” (1927/1962, p. 61) as Dasein is the 
clearing or light wherein Being shows itself. Levinas, 
however, takes Heidegger to task for leaving out what 
he takes to be the most fundamental and primordial 
foundation of all of philosophy. Levinas proposes a 
counter position to Heidegger’s Dasein-centric Being-
in-the-world, positing that the “Other is the principle 
of phenomena” (1961/1969, p. 92).  
  
Ethics as First Philosophy 
 
Levinas posits ethics as first philosophy as the 
“vigilant passivity to the call of the other which 
precedes our interest in Being” (Kearney & Levinas, 
1984, p. 65). “Man’s ethical relationship to the other 
is ultimately prior to his ontological relation to 
himself (egology) or to the totality of things which we 
call the world (cosmology)” (Kearney & Levinas, 
1984, p. 57). Levinas holds that, prior to the 
phenomenal realm, wherein Heidegger situates his 
ontology, rests the infinite alterity of the Other upon 
which subjectivity emerges. “I am defined as a 
subjectivity, as a singular person, as an ‘I’ precisely 
because I am exposed to the other” (Kearney & 
Levinas, 1984, p. 62). In this exposure, for Levinas, 
one is confronted by the Other, from above and 
beyond, approached outside of the plane of ontology. 
It is in this subjection to the Other that one finds 
ethics. Rather than first known in consciousness or 
thought, the Other is encountered as a face in the 
sensible approaching me from the outside, standing 
over and above me. Subordinate to the Other, I am 
always ethically responsible for the Other in an 
asymmetrical relationship in which “I” becomes a 
subject by taking on subjectivity, which is “being a 
hostage” (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 127). Levinas states 
that, since we find ourselves in the world with others, 
we are already for-the-Other, indicating that the 
ethical responsibility to answer the Other is prior to 
any choice or decision on my part. “Responsibility for 
another … precedes essence in [a subject] .... . The 
word I means … answering for everything and for 
everyone” (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 114). Subjectivity, 
according to Levinas, is a subjection to the Other who 
demands a response prior to my freedom and reason. 
Preceding any theoretical construct, the encounter 
with the Other is situated in ethics, whereby any 
thoughts or intentions concerning the Other arise only 
by virtue of having already welcomed the Other. 
Ethics and sociality go hand in hand for Levinas; the 
Other for whom I am responsible is also the Other to 
whom I respond.5 
                                                 
5 Levinas is not without his critics on this view. Slavoj 
Žižek, in particular, has been harshly critical of 
Levinasian ethics in its supposed inability to deal with the 
“inhuman” Other. Žižek (2005) argues powerfully that 
Levinasian ethics only “works” to the extent that one’s 
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Perhaps ethics enters through a back door in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time in his treatment of how 
Dasein encounters others, “dasein like myself”. 
Gleaning from the six pages Heidegger devotes to this 
topic, one will find three different ways that Dasein 
can encounter another like itself. The first way 
involves treating the other with besorgen rather than 
sorge. This amounts to treating the other like a thing, 
akin to the treatment of tools in accordance with one’s 
projects. In contrast, Heidegger identifies solicitude, 
which “corresponds to our use of ‘concern’ as a term 
for an existentiale” (1927/1962, p. 158) as the mode 
of care proper to an encounter with another Dasein 
like oneself. Heidegger specifies two kinds of 
solicitude: solicitude that “leaps in” for the other and 
takes away his or her freedom, or solicitude that 
“leaps ahead” of the other and frees the other for his 
or her freedom. While only the latter form of 
solicitude is authentic, for Heidegger “ethical” 
treatment of the other rests upon the other’s kind of 
“to be”; one encounters another Dasein in accordance 
with the kind of being that Dasein is, namely a being 
whose essence is is-ing. Dasein is the entity that has 
as its essence its existence; it is the clearing or light 
where Being shows itself. For Heidegger, Dasein, as 
the entity that “theres”, bestows existence upon things 
that appear to its consciousness – it “is-es”. For 
Levinas, “the illeity of this He is not the it of things 
which are at our disposal” (1963/1986, p. 359). In his 
view, thus, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology 
reduces the Other to the same by admitting nothing 
outside of itself; “within being, a transcendence 
revealed is inverted into immanence” (1963/1986, p. 
355). The other Dasein in Heidegger is encountered 
only as a phenomenon, in the plane of ontology, and 
encountered only out my concernful involvement 
within this totality. And, since authenticity is not 
equated with good and inauthenticity with evil, ethics, 
on which to formulate a notion of good and evil, 
remains absent in Heidegger. Levinas harkens us to 
the possibility that, without an ethics, the potential for 
the Holocaust emerges: “The source stems from the 
essential possibility of elemental Evil … inscribed 
within the ontology of a being concerned with being” 
and thus free of any ethical bond to the Other as other 
(Levinas, 1989/1990, p. 63).  
  
Dasein remains an insular being that remains self-
referential in all its projects, an insular totality of 
intention and phenomenon, being as being for me. 
                                                                          
“neighbours” are not evil, but that in the face of an evil 
neighbour, such passivity is an invitation to be destroyed. 
We would argue that what Žižek fails to comprehend is 
how, even in abject submission, one confronts us with a 
face as accusation. This insinuates a further line of 
questioning regarding whether Levinas’s Other and the 
obligations to it are metaphysical or concrete (see 
Bernasconi, 1989; Burns, 2008). 
Levinas alerts us to the perhaps obvious observation 
that speech is always spoken to. “We will also put 
into question the thesis according to which the 
ultimate essence of man and of truth is the 
comprehension of the being of beings, a thesis to 
which, we must agree, theory, experience, and 
discourse seem to lead” (1963/1986, p. 348). While 
experience would seem to affirm Heidegger’s Dasein-
centric beginning, as we never escape our own 
perspective, Levinas also points out that the Other, 
the not me, that which is separate from me, is the 
precondition for the possibility of experience. My 
human condition situates me before what is not me, as 
things have an alterity of their own apart from me. 
“The epiphany of the other involves a signifyingness 
of its own, independently of this signification 
received from the world” (Levinas, 1963/1986, p. 
351). For Heidegger, a thing only exists insofar as I 
have experience of it, always in reference to the same, 
within a totality. Things appear in reference to their 
usefulness to me out of my concern with the world. 
However, “communication would be impossible if it 
should have to begin in the ego”, for there would be 
no experience if there were not others, the not me 
(Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 119). 
 
Violence Inherent in Thematization 
 
Every encounter with the Other is possible only as a 
thematization and is thus a violation of the Other’s 
infinity. “In relating to a being in the opening of 
being, comprehension locates a signification on the 
basis of being. In this sense, it does not invoke a 
being, but only names it, thus accomplishing a 
violence and a negation; a partial negation which is 
violence” (Levinas, 1951/1989, p. 127). But is there 
any way of encountering the Other that is not violent 
for Levinas? Levinas recognizes the conundrum of 
the Other being beyond Being: “the beyond being 
does and does not revert to ontology; the statement, 
the beyond, the infinite, becomes and does not 
become a meaning of being” (1974/1998, p. 19). He 
addresses this paradox in several ways, including the 
necessity of thematization and his distinction between 
saying and said.   
  
The conception of the Other as beyond Being rests 
upon Levinas’s distinction between totality and 
infinity. When one totalizes the Other, one reduces 
the Other to the same by likening the Other to oneself 
in describing him or her in relation to being. To 
comprehend the Other as the same, the Other is 
understood in relation to being as though an object of 
consciousness. Totality describes the theoretical 
realm in which the Other can only be conceived in 
light of being, as is the circumstance in Heidegger’s 
existential ontology where the Other’s relation to 
oneself, or to the same, is not called into question. 
Levinas notes that “the comprehension of Being is 
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said to the existent, who again arises behind the 
theme in which he is presented” (1961/1969, pp. 47-
48). Understanding the Other’s being within such a 
totality fails to take into account the relationship with 
the Other that precedes the ontological, phenomenal 
and theoretical realm. Levinas turns to the notion of 
infinity which encompasses the ethical realm where 
this relationship with the Other arises from the Other 
who comes from beyond as irreducible to an intention 
of thought or will. The Other “at each moment 
destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves 
me” (1961/1969, p. 51). The question of the Other is 
not an either/or but rather a both/and in which the 
Other, as beyond being, is at the same time both a 
totality and an infinity.  
  
Thematization and totalization both partake in a 
relation of knowing where the Other is rendered as 
same – that is, as a phenomenon. In totalization, one 
reduces the Other to the same such that the Other’s 
alterity is not taken account of, whereas thematization 
“does not exhaust the meaning of the relationship 
with exteriority” (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 301). 
Thematization is the way in which any thing appears 
as a phenomenon. Experientially, thematization is 
unavoidable. Metaphysically, however, this encounter 
is inherently violent, as it delimits the Other’s alterity. 
The practical implication of thematization would 
perhaps amount to mindfulness of the Other’s alterity. 
Levinas describes the relation with the Other as one 
of desire, stating that “the desirable does not fill up 
my desire but hollows it out, nourishing me as it were 
with new hungers” (1963/1986, p. 351). As opposed 
to needing the Other, Levinas states that we desire the 
Other, and this desire for another is “our very 
sociality” (1963/1986, p. 350). Arising out of him 
who has no needs, desire is the relationship with the 
Other who calls me into question. This relationship of 
desire is what we are called to remain mindful of. 
 
Saying What Cannot Be Said 
 
According to Levinas, it is through language that 
signification arises and meaning emerges, because, 
when one speaks, one addresses an Other. Discerning 
between two parts of speech, Levinas distinguishes 
between the said, as a disclosing, and the saying, as a 
revealing. The words form the content of one’s 
speech which comprise the said or the “what” of 
speech. However, before language is about something 
(the said) it is first spoken to someone (the saying). 
The impossibility of encountering the Other without 
speaking or saying anything attests to the primacy of 
the ethical.  In other words, the “who” is prior to the 
“what” in discourse. The saying manifests that the 
Other comes from beyond being, as the face reveals 
through expression, speech, discourse. Expression is 
thus inseparable from the face that speaks. It is in the 
saying to someone that the Other is uncovered and 
becomes defenceless, vulnerable, and naked. “The 
responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to 
anything said” (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 43). The 
responsibility arises on the part of the hearer to the 
saying, as the possibility for violence and the injustice 
of totalization occur through the reduction of the 
Other to the said when the Other’s speech is seen as a 
disclosure. For Levinas, one is always saying more 
than one says (in the sense of the said), and it is an 
ethical responsibility not to approach the Other as a 
phenomenon through the said, through disclosure. 
  
Levinas’s phenomenology prioritizes the Other, who 
alone manifests him or herself as beyond the capacity 
to be contained in a totality. For Levinas, the Other is 
the starting point of all meaning and all signification. 
“One has to go back to that hither side, starting from 
the trace retained by the said, in which everything 
shows itself. The movement back to the saying is the 
phenomenological reduction” (Levinas, 1974/1998, p. 
53). Levinas’s interpersonal phenomenology entails 
that being, existence and experience are always in 
light of the Other. If the subject matter of 
phenomenological research is the world as it is 
experienced by the Other, Levinas’s phenomenology 
shows that this world only emerges by virtue of 
discourse: “the world is offered in the language of the 
Other” (1961/1969, p. 92). 
  
Levinas has already demonstrated the impossibility of 
totalizing the Other, since the Other is beyond being. 
However, the beyond does not mean that one can get 
outside of being and existence. In his essay entitled 
“On Escape” (1982/2003), Levinas informs us that 
the need to escape being arises from the need to 
escape oneself. This need to get beyond being is 
accomplished, albeit in a paradoxical solution, by 
exploring being – the only way out is in. Levinas 
himself cannot escape this paradox, nor does he 
attempt to hide from it. His conundrum rests with the 
impossibility of saying the unsayable. In fact, his 
writings are testaments to the impossibility of 
accomplishing this task. It is neither his goal nor his 
project to deny that being, knowledge and experience 
exist, but rather to return to the pre-condition for 
these totalities. Levinas’s phenomenology seeks to 
determine the conditions of possibilities for truth, 
language, being and existence.  
  
“The idea of infinity is desire” (Levinas, 1963/1986, 
p. 353). Through desire, the Other awakens in me 
new hungers by opening me up to that which is 
outside of me. It is the Other, as infinite, that comes 
to me from beyond being, whose face speaks to me 
about the world. “Being is a world in which one 
speaks and of which one speaks” (1961/1969, p. 181). 
Recall that language is already for the Other; Levinas 
alerts us to the obvious fact that speaking always 
addresses someone. The Other, for him, is the only 
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“object” which cannot be rendered as a phenomenon. 
The face of the Other signifies that which itself 
cannot be reduced to a theme. The Other comes from 
beyond, rupturing the continuity of the same, as “[t]he 
relationship with the Other is not produced outside of 
the world, but puts in question the world possessed” 
(Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 173). My solitary possession 
of the world is ruptured by the Other’s face which 
speaks to me. “The relationship with the Other, trans-
cendence, consists in speaking the world to the Other” 
(Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 173). The Other presents the 
world to me, and it is through speaking, through 
saying, that I invite the Other who ruptures my world 
to now share and partake in our world. In a 
Levinasian approach to phenomenological research, 
the face-to-face relationship between the researcher 
and the research participant, now understood as 
Levinasian “interlocutor”, provides the grounds upon 
which the Other’s world comes to be as the 
interlocutor speaks to the researcher about the 
phenomenal world of meaning. For it is only in 
speaking to someone that a world as a community of 
discourse can come to be shared. “To speak is to 
make the world common, to create commonplaces” 
(Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 76). Only when ethics is first 
philosophy can the Other’s alterity fully emerge. The 
ethical dimension of phenomenological research 
would thus consist of the researcher always remaining 
mindful of the interlocutor’s alterity and infinity. 
Through the very act of research, the researcher 
enacts the relationship to the Other of a hunger that is 
not sated but rather exposes ever new hungers.  
 
The Other ruptures my world by presenting him- or 
herself as a face, as everything I am not, by calling 
into question my freedom and spontaneity of the 
same, of the totality. It is the presence of the Other 
that brings about “the primordial event of 
signification” (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 92). This does 
not mean, however, that my existence is predicated 
upon the thought of the Other, but rather that, in 
approaching the Other, I pass from a phenomenon to 
possessing the idea of infinity in which the Other 
overflows my capacity to contain him or her. “The 
relation with the Other, or Conversation, is … an 
ethical relation … is a teaching” (1961/1969, p. 51). 
The relationship with the Other means precisely to be 
taught as one receives something wholly new from 
the Other’s discourse.  
 
Implications for Research 
 
Levinas’s attention to the pre-ontological and pre-
theoretical ethical realm raises the question whether 
the very notion of Levinasian “phenomenological” 
research is something of an oxymoron. Kunz (2006) 
suggests as much in making a distinction between the 
natural science, phenomenological and “psychology 
for the Other” models of psychology. When the goal 
of phenomenological research is ultimately the 
production of knowledge regarding the Other’s life-
world, which is inherently ontological in a 
Heideggerian phenomenology, focus on the pre-
ontological would seem to place Levinas 
fundamentally at odds with this pursuit. At the same 
time, however, his oscillation between the said and 
saying, between the phenomenological and the 
ethical, points to the paradoxical relationship between 
the transcendental and existential aspects of being in 
the service of reaching the ethical dimension. This 
might be taken to suggest that, since it is only in the 
phenomenological realm that anything becomes 
perceptible at all, the only way to “escape” the 
phenomenological realm (see Levinas, 1982/2003) is 
to enter into it in a renewed way. Taking this as a 
point of departure, let us now examine what Levinas’s 
phenomenology of the Other might mean in the 
practice of EP research in terms of the participant as 
interlocutor, the data as work, and the topic of such 
research as not the Other, but the world offered up by 
and in the language of the Other. 
 
The Data as a Levinasian Work 
 
Levinas suggests that spoken language has preference 
over the written word, as the presence of the face in 
the former entails the overflowing infinity of the 
Other. He then goes on to say that “all signs can serve 
as language”, implying that even written works 
contain within them the overflowing presence of the 
infinity of the saying which makes possible the said 
(1961/1969, p. 182). Not only experiential research 
(Garza, 2007), as has been favoured by the 
“Duquesne School”, but also other varieties of 
phenomenological research, including historical and 
archival research (Garza, 2007), would be possible 
using a Levinasian approach, as all “works” (the said) 
contain within them the expression of the Other (the 
saying), even though the Other is absent from the 
work itself (the said). The works themselves could be 
either written, an interview, archives, or behaviour 
(Garza, 2007), and need not be limited to written data. 
Within the work, a trace is left by the Other which 
signifies the Other’s coming from beyond. “A trace is 
not a sign like any other. But every trace also plays 
the role of a sign; it can be taken for a sign” (Levinas, 
1963/1986, p. 356). The trace remains in the work as 
an indelible mark of the Other having disturbed the 
order of the same. “Disclosure,” Levinas writes, “is 
suppressed in traces” (1963/1986, p. 357). Within 
research, the researcher must remain mindful of the 
alterity of the Other and make explicitly clear that the 
works themselves do not contain the presence of the 
Other within the said. The thematization of the 
Other’s world does not totalize the Other so long as 
the researcher remains mindful of the Other’s alterity 
and explicitly states that the subject matter of such 
research is intentionally not the Other. 
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“A work is thus a relationship with the other who is 
reached without showing himself touched” (Levinas, 
1963/1986, p. 349). Levinas’s emphasis upon the 
alterity of the Other and the ultimate unknowability of 
the Other entails that the Other always rests outside of 
the researcher’s ability to totalize the interlocutor and 
reduce him or her to the same. In the research 
situation, this fact does not imply that the world and 
the phenomenon cannot be studied even if 
thematization remains deficient. The interlocutor is 
viewed as the condition for the possibility of even 
having a world and a phenomenon to study. 
Phenomena are thus seen as arising out of the 
discourse between the researcher and the participant 
as interlocutor. The results of such research are thus 
the insertion of the dialogue between researcher and 
interlocutor into the phenomenal realm as themes. 
 
From Co-Researcher to Participant Interlocutor as 
Other  
 
While we do not dispute the value of Kunz’s project 
of a “psychology for the Other”, we hope to examine 
whether and to what extent something akin to the 
ethical relation is in play in EP research. Since its 
earliest incarnations (cf. Strasser, in Polkinghorne, 
1989), the research participant has always been 
afforded special status in EP research, with research 
participants “not to be treated as experimental objects 
for the use of the researcher; the role and 
responsibility of the participants is to share their 
experiences with the researcher” (Polkinghorne, 1989, 
p. 47). Von Eckartsberg (1998) goes so far as to 
designate participants “co-researchers” (CRs) in light 
of their co-operative contribution. Since, in existential 
phenomenology, phenomena are always for someone, 
the CR’s role is to be the someone for whom the 
phenomenon appears. Still, the attention given to the 
CR is in the service of revealing the phenomenal and 
the noetic horizons that constitute it as such. 
Polkinghorne concedes as much in saying that even 
dialogal interview techniques in EP research “[seek] 
descriptions of the experience itself without the 
subject’s interpretation” (p. 47). 
 
From a Levinasian perspective, one could say that EP 
research is susceptible to the danger of taking up the 
CR as a phenomenon in a totalizing way that would 
be at odds with Levinas’s ethical relationship. This 
totalization would imply that the researcher has 
forgotten that the Other is “the stranger who visits 
me” (Peperzak, 1989, p. 17) from outside the pheno-
menological realm of my concerns and projects. For 
Levinas, this would amount to forgetting the ethical 
responsibility I have for the Other. 
 
An EP response to this charge might be to say that our 
concern is with phenomena and not with the Other as 
such. The phenomenological researcher “observes the 
lived world … looks over the shoulder of the Other to 
see the Other’s psychologically lived conditions … 
the Other’s … lived meanings” (Kunz, 2006, p. 255). 
Perhaps this raises the disturbing question of whether 
it is better to be treated badly or to be ignored. But 
further consideration of this question in light of actual 
praxis suggests that it presents a false choice for both 
Levinas and existential phenomenology. It is not a 
case of either/or. It is a case of both/and. In a 
Levinasian sense it would not be a choice, since 
attunement to the ethical would preclude treating 
someone unethically. However, Levinas himself 
seems to acknowledge that thematization of the Other 
is inescapable inasmuch as we live with Others in the 
phenomenal world. In EP research, the falseness of 
the choice resides in part in the fact that one could 
existentially choose to take the Other up either as a 
tool or thing or as Dasein like myself and, either way, 
still be ontologically “authentic”. In short, there is a 
totality and infinity for research rooted in both 
Heideggerian and Levinasian philosophy. Heidegger 
begins in totality and places infinity “outside” of the 
scope of his inquiry in its very inception in light of his 
project of a phenomenological ontology, whereas 
Levinas starts at the basis of infinity as the possibility 
for totality. 
 
Levinas admonishes us against the totalization of the 
Other as a phenomenon, but also acknowledges that 
phenomena are rooted in the ethical dimension of 
otherness. EP research engages in the thematization 
of the Other and his or her world while remaining 
mindful of Strasser’s claim “that the meaning and 
contents of experience are not within but between 
persons” (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 47). Levinas urges 
us to surpass the level of phenomena (the said) to 
reach the level of the ethical (saying). At the same 
time, he acknowledges that the saying cannot be said, 
that it is the foundation of discourse but cannot itself 
enter into discourse. EP research focuses on the said, 
the individual thematic rendering of phenomena as 
“for someone”, while trying to remain mindful of the 
otherness of both the CR and the world. Giorgi and 
Giorgi’s (2003) example of a meal rendered 
alternately as salty (in itself) versus salty for me 
illustrates how, through the epoché, the transcendence 
of the world and the Other who render it are 
preserved even as the immanent experience is 
described. Ultimately, Levinas’s conundrum is the 
question of how one says the unsayable. EP 
research’s conundrum is how to unsay the said. 
 
Phenomenology, in its explicit orientation to the 
phenomenal, might be accused of neglecting saying. 
Levinas might be accused of neglecting the said. But 
careful examination reveals that the situation is not as 
simple as this. Saying and said, transcendent and 
existential, are mutually implicit in both views. “In 
becoming a theme, [an entity] does indeed retain a 
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foreignness with respect to the thinker that embraces 
it” (Levinas, 1963/1986, p. 345). In Levinas, saying is 
focal and the said is always in the service of pointing 
us towards saying. EP research focuses on the said, 
but leaves an opening for the nascent emergence of 
the Other, although perhaps still within the constraints 
of my own projects and concerns. For example, 
Churchill and Wertz (2002) describe how it is through 
a “resonating attunement” to the phenomenal object 
of inquiry that “one begins to understand the other’s 
position and the rich meanings described” (p. 252). It 
is when the researcher (R) “trades places” (Husserl, 
cited in Churchill & Wertz, 2002) with the CR that he 
or she “can begin to acquaint himself or herself with 
the essential meanings and organization of the 
experience” (p. 252). Similarly, the first step of 
Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method 
(1985) emphasizes that our initial presence to the data 
as text must refrain from interpretation so as to guard 
against the imposition of the R’s meanings onto the 
experience of the CR. In an analogous way, Levinas 
points to how it is through the phenomenal, being, the 
said, that one arrives at the transcendent, the ethical, 
the saying (Peperzak, 1989). In the data as work, we 
encounter the absent Other as trace (Levinas, 1961/ 
1969, 1963/1986). As absolute absence, this Other 
always eludes our thematization, remains infinite. 
 
A final concern regarding the totalization of the CR in 
EP research rests in the misconception that the goal of 
such research is somehow to “reproduce the 
consciousness” of the CR as its result (see, for 
example, Kendler, 2005). EP research seems to 
acknowledge that the CR also remains mysterious, 
beyond me, “infinite”. It is an epistemological 
necessity of EP research that Rs limit themselves to 
speaking about the world of the particular CR, 
rendered through his or her disclosive interpretative 
presence to it. But “to attend to experience as 
experienced does not mean to somehow enter the 
mind of the other and ‘reproduce’ his or her conscious 
experience as a sort of ‘content’” (Garza, 2006, p. 
256). Even so, EP research remains stridently focused 
on experience. “Reproduction of the other’s 
consciousness as content is not the goal of 
phenomenological inquiry in psychology so much as 
developing an illuminative understanding of an 
experience” (Garza, 2006, p. 256). In this way, EP 
research acknowledges the alterity of the world and 
the Other and makes its focus upon phenomena not an 
error but an explicit choice. 
 
This choice in EP research imposes restrictions on our 
ability to encounter the Other as other. Similarly, in 
Levinas, inasmuch as one is always “I”, it seems that 
in praxis the radical alterity of the Other persistently 
eludes us. Phenomenological research of necessity 
encounters the CR as a phenomenon in the service of 
revealing phenomena. While Levinas might assert 
that this means that we totalize the Other in EP 
research (or at the very least thematize him or her, 
violating the radicality of his or her alterity), it falls to 
such research to be mindful that this is so. As EP 
researchers we are not claiming to have encountered 
the Other in his or her infinity. Levinas’s admonition 
is to attend to the Other in his or her totality and 
infinity. Yet this admonition confronts us with a 
conundrum – how does one remain mindful of the 
saying without reducing it to the said? Levinas deals 
with the conundrum of saying (in the sense of the 
said) “the saying” through “the said”. This is 
inescapably so. How else would it become an object 
of inquiry except by his speaking of it (the said)? This 
means he must remain mindful that such saying (said) 
entails some violation of the essence of “saying”. 
Likewise, EP research faces the task of saying (in the 
sense of the said) “the saying” of the CR while 
recognizing that both the CR and his or her world are 
not totalized in such saying (as said). 
  
The Research Situation and Alterity  
 
Insofar as EP research explicitly focuses upon 
phenomena, the alterity of the Other remains at most 
an unspoken background. Making the lifeworld the 
subject matter of EP research imposes constraints not 
only on its ability to discern the otherness of the CR, 
but on its ability to see meaning originating outside of 
a totality. A telling example is van Kaam’s (1959) 
prototypic study of feeling understood. In this study, 
van Kaam recasts the implicitly interpersonal pheno-
menon of being understood in subjectivist terms of 
“feeling understood” revelatory of arguably only one 
half of the experience. In essence, the constituents of 
the experience he describes are perceptions of the 
understanding Other by the understood, or feelings of 
the understood regarding the relationship to the 
understanding one. The Other is thus acknowledged 
only through the perspective of the CR. 
 
A similar study (DeAses, cited in Garza, 2007) sought 
to examine the phenomenon of interpersonal missing 
manifest in a married couple separated by military 
deployment. Early in the research process it became 
apparent that the “phenomenon” was not disclosively 
realized from a singular perspective. The Heidegger-
ian model for a singular Dasein could not hold sway 
here. The co-missing of this couple was made 
manifest dialogally through their correspondence, and 
revealed as a dimension of a shared world of meaning 
neither reducible to the perspective of either member 
of the couple nor merely the sum or adumbration of 
those perspectives. The study shows that, at the very 
least, some realms of lived meaning are constituted 
interpersonally as pre-thematic understanding. It also 
suggests, in line with thinkers like Strasser (cited in 
Polkinghorne, 1989) and Halling, Kunz, and Rowe 
(1994), that meaning emerges not just within persons 
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but also between them. What are the implications of 
this for EP research? 
 
One implication would be the need to make 
adjustments at the level of methodology. Pollio, 
Henley, and Thompson (1997) describe the inclusion 
of an interview wherein the CR examines and 
validates the R’s analysis of the data. While this is an 
admirable overture to preserving the alterity of the 
CR, it is not without its dangers. For example, 
following Merleau-Ponty’s (1942/1963) recognition 
that some intentions are lived but not known and 
Churchill’s (2000) description of the prevalence of 
self-deception in narrative data, the CR cannot 
become the final arbiter of the reality of his or her 
experience. One might say in this light that Polio et 
al. (1997) see the CR as Other to the R while running 
the risk of neglecting how the R, in serving as the 
Other for the CR, helps to ground the reality of the 
CR’s experience. 
 
Another example of methodological adjustment is 
Halling et al.’s (1994) adoption of a dialogal 
procedure for gathering data. They describe a 
technique of reflective conversation or dialogue out of 
which comes a knowledge “that both creates 
community and is grounded in community” (p. 111). 
In this model, data analysis is also collaborative, 
emphasizing their view that “what is known grows 
out of the interaction between people that, in turn, 
leads to a deepening of community based on shared 
understanding” (p. 111). Meanings are discerned and 
interpretations of data are accomplished “through the 
process of dialogue rather than following predefined 
procedures or steps” (p. 111). Kunz (cited in Halling 
et al., 1994) himself cites a Levinasian basis for this, 
asserting that “the other person challenges each one 
of us to become aware of and bracket our 
assumptions” (p. 126). 
 
Inversely to Pollio et al.’s technique where the CR 
serves as Other to the R, in Halling et al. the R, or 
rather the research group, serves as Other for the CR, 
grounding his or her experience in the transpersonal 
structure of the research situation. Again, this is an 
admirable acknowledgement of the transpersonal 
character of phenomena and knowledge, but it too is 
not without its difficulties. For example, the 
communal character of both data gathering and 
analysis raises the question of the CRs’ 
accommodation of what they take to be the R’s 
expectations, and hence of the possible “loss” of the 
Other’s particular and idiosyncratic meanings in the 
process of dialogue. The knowledge produced in such 
research is indeed communal, as Halling et al. (1994) 
describe. But it may also have been transformed in 
the research process from its original meaning for the 
CR. Of course, the taking up of a CR’s expression by 
any R will of necessity be transformative. But it 
seems that, whereas Pollio et al.’s method might give 
the CR too much centrality as author of the meaning 
of experience and neglect the otherness of the R, 
Halling et al. might be said to risk not giving the CR 
enough centrality, and also perhaps to risk subsuming 
the particular otherness of the CR into the more 
general otherness of the research group. Finally, while 
Halling et al.’s decision not to adopt prescriptive steps 
in a methodological process seems an admirable nod 
to the Other-ed character of knowledge, in the 
research context it ultimately raises the possibility 
that the desire to uphold the community of the saying 
makes it difficult to communicate the method through 
the said. It is important to note that these comments 
are not meant to suggest fault with either of these 
research models. They are meant to note the 
vulnerabilities that may inhere in each and to point to 
where practitioners may need to be especially mindful 
of their duties to the ethical relationship.  
 
Pollio et al. (1997) formulate the appeal to the Other 
as method, while Halling et al. (1994) seek to 
preserve the Other through methodological openness. 
We would like to suggest that the steps necessary to 
heed the Levinasian imperative of the primacy of the 
Other are not necessarily methodological, or at least 
not necessarily procedural. We suggest instead that 
the EP research process is itself inherently dialogal. 
We suggest that alterity is inherent in the research 
situation both in how the CR is the Other for the R 
and in how the R is the Other for the CR, regardless 
of the specific kinds of data interrogated or the 
concrete constitution of the data-gathering situation. 
This would even extend to situations where there is 
no CR proper, such as archival research (see Garza, 
2007), inasmuch as writing, and even cultural 
artefacts, can be understood as forms of the said.6   
 
Since “the Other is the principle of phenomena” 
(Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 92), this means that the R in 
EP research gives voice to the CR’s world. It also 
means that, because the CR is Other to the R, the 
researcher is ethically bound to give voice to the CR’s 
world and thus to usher it from the anonymity of the il 
y a by creating a co-constituted world of meaning on 
the basis of both what is unsaid and what is said in 
the CR’s works. It is an ethical obligation to answer 
the call of the Other; the hearer has a responsibility to 
the speaker and the saying. But the ethical 
relationship is a two way street, in that, while we, as 
Rs, are bound to tell the CR’s truth, the CR is bound 
to be truthful to us as our informant regarding his or 
                                                 
6 Levinas seems to posit a surplus of spoken language over 
written language owing to the presence of the interlocutor 
in the former, but also suggests that mindfulness of the 
“primordial manifestation of the Other” enables verbal 
and written signs to serve as language (Levinas, 1961/ 
1969, p. 182).   
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her world of experience. The ethical obligations in the 
research situation, for both R and CR, are to the Other 
as constituting a relational origin of a world of 
meaning that they can come to share, given that 
“[s]ignification starts with the speech in which the 
world is at the same time thematized and interpreted” 
by the Other (Levinas, 1961/1969, p. 97). 
 
In other words, the results of EP research are 
reducible neither to the CR nor the R, but rather 
emerge synthetically from the research process itself. 
The ethical obligation to the Other is not met by 
empathy, because empathy implies a phenomenal 
understanding of the Other and his or her world. The 
radical alterity of the Other means that the Other 
comes from beyond any understanding at the 
phenomenal level. Both the R and the CR rupture 
each other’s autistic world. Each speaks the Other’s 
relatedness to being in a necessarily thematizing way, 
but the ethical admonition against totalization, and the 
foreknowledge of the Other as other, remind us that 
the CR and his or her world always outstrip our 
ability to thematize them. In this we make it possible 
to catch glimpses of the Other’s and the world’s 
infinity. “It is in the trace of the Other that the face 
shines; what is presented there is absolving itself from 
my life and visits me as already absolute. Someone 
has already passed. His trace does not signify his past, 
as it does not signify his labour or his enjoyment in 
the world; it is a disturbance imprinting itself (we are 
tempted to say engraving itself) with an 
unexceptionable gravity” (Levinas, 1963/1986, p. 
359). This may be difficult, since the responsibility is 
both pre-phenomenological and pre-ontological, but 
remaining mindful of this would constitute the ethical 
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